Sense-making across disciplines : physical models, theoretical frameworks, and the connections between education in the humanities and sciences by Moore, J. Christopher & Connections
Symposia Melitensia  Number 14 (2018)
Sense-making across 
Disciplines: Physical Models, 
Theoretical Frameworks, and 
the Connections between 




Abstract: Across disciplines, the fundamental goal of authentic learning is sense-making: 
making sense of the world around us, our interactions, and art. As education shifts from 
a discipline focused on propagating knowledge as ‘stuff’ to a focus on propagating 
understanding and teaching the means towards understanding, the learning of sense-
making practice across the disciplines is becoming more important. In the recent past, 
education at nearly all levels has focused on the teaching of facts. The practices of 
experts within disciplines were taught rarely, if at all, and almost exclusively at the level of 
domain-specific skills. However, sense-making practices are surprisingly universal, and 
not just across the sciences. In this paper, I discuss the parallels between the sciences 
and humanities with respect to the practice of sense-making, specifically the mental/
physical models in the sciences and the theoretical frameworks deployed in the social 
sciences and the humanities. I will make the case that we should begin addressing in our 
classrooms the cross-cutting nature of the practices of all learners, so that students can 
see how what they are doing when analysing history is not epistemologically dissimilar 
to their physics class.
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Across disciplines, the fundamental goal of authentic learning is 
sense-making: making sense of the world around us, our interactions, 
and art. Sense-making goes beyond content knowledge. For example, 
when studying history, knowing when and where something happened 
is necessary but insufficient to the understanding of why and how. 
Knowing science facts, like the shape and location of the mitochondria 
is necessary but insufficient to the understanding of its role in the 
cell. Knowing and identifying plot structures is necessary but 
insufficient to the understanding of the author’s message or the work’s 
place in culture. Knowing in general is necessary but insufficient to 
understanding.1 
As education shifts from a discipline focused on propagating 
knowledge as ‘stuff’ to a focus on propagating understanding and 
teaching the means towards understanding, the learning of sense-
making practice across the disciplines is becoming more important. In 
the recent past, education at nearly all levels has focused on the teaching 
of facts.2 The practices of experts within disciplines were taught rarely, 
if at all, and almost exclusively at the level of domain-specific skills. 
However, sense-making practices are surprisingly universal, and not 
just across the sciences. 
This paper will discuss the parallels between the sciences and 
humanities with respect to the practice of sense-making: mental/
physical models in the sciences and the theoretical frameworks 
deployed in the social sciences and the humanities. In particular, I will 
discuss the universal theory of learning called ‘situated cognition,’ and 
its application to multiple disciplines, including science. In particular, 
we will look at how modelling and testing in science parallels building 
and using frameworks in other disciplines, and how the sharing of 
effective teaching strategies across the arts/science divide could be 
beneficial for everyone. To this end, I will discuss my science education 
group’s work on teaching science practice with respect to modelling and 
how integrating practice with context/content leads to understanding 
and knowing within the context of situated cognition. Specifically, I 
shall describe and demonstrate the teaching theory called ‘cognitive 
1 J. Greeno, ‘Gibson's affordances’, Psychological Review, 101 (1994) 336–42.
2 J.C. Moore, Creating Scientists: Teaching and assessing science practice for the NGSS 
(New York, 2017), 22.
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apprenticeship,’ and show how this framework for teaching can be used 
across disciplines to develop broader sense-making abilities.
When focusing on the practices of science that are universal, the 
learner begins to make the connections between disciplines and see 
investigation as a universal process for truth-seeking as opposed to 
a context-depended means to learning facts within a tiny domain. 
Their entire epistemology changes, and this which we have found is 
fundamental for students making the novice-expert transition.3 I shall 
make the case that we should go one step further and begin addressing 
in our classrooms the cross-cutting nature of the practices of all learners, 
so that students can see how what they are doing when analysing history 
is not epistemologically dissimilar to their physics class.
Situated cognition: a theory of learning
Situated cognition is a learning theory that assumes all knowledge 
is situated in actions that occur within cultural, social, and physical 
contexts.4 In simpler language, knowledge is inseparable from doing. 
More importantly, knowledge cannot be separated from the means in 
which the knowledge is learned by the community that ‘knows’ it. In 
our case, situated cognition tells us that students can only understand 
science or humanities ideas if they understand how the practice of the 
practitioner leads to those ideas.
What does it mean ‘to understand’ a topic. Within the framework of 
situated cognition, three fundamental components combine within the 
learner’s mind to form a deep understanding: (1) content knowledge, 
(2) practice abilities, and (3) appropriate reasoning to link the practice 
to the knowledge.5 These three components can be considered the three 
legs of a stool: remove one leg, and the stool falls down. Similarly, the 
3 3 J.C. Moore, Creating Scientists: Teaching and assessing science practice for the NGSS 
(New York, 2017), 22. Students to Think More Like Scientists’, European Journal of Phys-
ics Education, 3 (2012), 1–12.
4 J. Brown, A. Collins, and P. Duguid, ‘Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning’, Edu-
cational Researcher, 18 (1989), 32.
5	 J.C.	Moore,	Teaching	 science	 thinking:	 developing	 scientific	 reasoning	 in	 the	 classroom	
(New	York,	 2018);	D.	Kuhn,	 ‘What	 is	 scientific	 thinking	 and	 how	does	 it	 develop?’,	 in	
Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development, ed. U. Goswami (Malden, 
2014), 371–93.
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absence of either component within some context results in a lack of 
true understanding of that context. The learner may know facts, but 
without the underlying context of how those facts came to be known, 
and the thinking required to link actions to knowing, the learner does 
not understand the content that they know.
For example, if we tell a small child that the stove is hot and will 
burn her, does that child now understand the concepts of heat and 
burning? They might not touch the stove because they were told not 
to, but they have not truly developed an understanding without also 
learning how the knowledge that ‘stove equals danger’ came into being. 
In this instance, we have separated the knowledge from the process 
of gaining the knowledge. Similarly, in the context of science, we 
can tell students that the mitochondria is the battery of the cell. The 
students can then repeat this on an examination and label it properly 
on a diagram. However, do those students now truly understand what 
the mitochondria is and does? Students of literature may be taught and 
therefore know that the green light in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great 
Gatsby is a symbol for the ‘American dream’ broadly, and the character 
Gatsby’s hopes and dreams for the future specifically. However, do 
students necessarily understand literary symbols and their construction, 
identification, and interpretation?
Situated cognition tells us that true knowing does not happen without 
action. How can the learner find out what the mitochondria does? 
What evidence can they draw on? Specifically, what actions does the 
expert perform that lead to knowledge about the mitochondria? How 
does the learner interpret symbols? Can they do so in a new context 
unaided? What actions does the expert perform that lead to appropriate 
identification and interpretation? Fundamentally, situated cognition 
tells us that understanding is a verb, not a noun, as opposed to theories 
of knowledge as accumulated stuff in our brains.
In the USA, situated cognition as a fundamental framework for 
learning has been incorporated within national standards across 
disciplines. With respect to the sciences, the Next Generation Science 
Standards (NGSS) are a set of national suggestions based on the 
USA National Research Council’s report A Framework for K-12 
Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts, and Core Ideas.6 
6 National Research Council, A Framework for K-12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscut-
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Specifically, the NGSS tightly integrates science practice, reasoning, 
and science content. As examples of this tight integration of content 
with action, I present the following excerpts from the NGSS student-
performance expectations:
Students who demonstrate understanding can
1. construct an argument supported by empirical evidence to 
support … [content]
2. develop a model based on evidence to illustrate … [content]
3. conduct an investigation to provide evidence that … [content]
The general formula for all performance expectations within the 
NGSS is as follows: students who demonstrate understanding … can 
perform science practice … in pursuit of content. A similar pattern in 
seen in new standards in the USA across disciplines, as reflected in the 
Common Core Standards Initiative.7
Situated cognition says that students can only understand ideas if 
they understand how to practice in context. Merely ‘knowing’ some 
fact does not in itself signify understanding, no more than being able to 
repeat that the stove is hot signifies understanding of hotness. Students 
learn science by doing science. Students learn historical analysis by 
doing historical analysis. Students learn art by doing art. This theory 
of learning leads to the obvious theory of teaching: you teach students 
science by teaching them how to do science and then having them do 
it. This is what we call cognitive apprenticeship, and it is the polar 
opposite of teaching-by-telling.
A cognitive apprenticeship and making connections across 
disciplines
In a traditional apprenticeship the apprentice learns processes through 
physical integration into the practices associated with the content area.8 
As an example from my own past, I once trained as an electrician’s 
apprentice before going to university. I worked side-by-side with a 
ting Concepts, and Core Ideas (Washington, D.C., 2012); NGSS Lead States, ‘Standards by 
DCI’ in The Next Generation Science Standards: For States, By States (Washington, 2013).
7 National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, Common Core State Standards 
(Washington, D.C., 2010).
8 D. Pratt, Five perspectives on teaching in adult and higher education (Ann Arbor, MI, 1998).
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professional master electrician who showed me the trade. I learned by 
watching an expert, then doing electrical work under his supervision. 
As I gained more and more abilities, the master electrician allowed me 
more and more freedom to work until I was eventually practising on 
my own.
Cognitive apprenticeship borrows from traditional apprenticeship as 
an applied teaching technique for students constrained to the classroom. 
Research across many different disciplines has shown that simulating 
expert-like practice in context and in an aided environment can increase 
student abilities in an unaided setting.9 For example, when we teach 
science in the classroom using cognitive apprenticeship as a framework, 
we are really doing what is called ‘simulated’ apprenticeship. Instead, if 
we get students involved in real science explorations, such as working 
in a research laboratory on a university campus or research centre under 
the direction of a professional scientist, then students  are doing what 
Barb and Hay loosely describe as ‘science at the elbows of experts’.10 
The principal teaching methods of cognitive apprenticeship 
are modelling, coaching, scaffolding, reflection, articulation, and 
exploration.11 For modelling, a subject expert explicitly demonstrates a 
task to the student. The student is able to build a conceptual model for 
the task. Once students have developed a conceptual model, the expert 
observes them attempting a task and gives them feedback and assistance 
at critical moments (coaching). Assistance is slowly withdrawn as 
students gain new abilities and can manage more of the task on their 
own (scaffolding). Reflection and articulation serve to internalize the 
student’s observations and experience, as well as aid in integrating new 
knowledge and problem-solving abilities. Finally, exploration fosters 
independence and encourages autonomous problem formulations and 
solutions. In a proper exploration, students can set their own goals and 
develop their own testing strategies, all of which fosters independent 
learning.12
9 A. Ghefaili, ‘Cognitive apprenticeship, technology, and the contextualization of learning 
environments’, Journal of Educational Computing, Design, and Online Learning, 4 (2003).
10 S. Barab and K. Hay, ‘Doing science at the elbows of experts: Issues related to the science 
apprenticeship camp’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 38 (2001), 70–102.
11 A. Collins, J. Brown, and A. Holum, ‘Cognitive Apprenticeship: Making Thinking Visible’, 
American Educator, 6 (1991), 38–46.
12 B. Larkins, J. Moore, L. Rubbo, and L. Covington, ‘Application of the cognitive appren-
ticeship framework to a middle school robotics camp’, in SIGCSE 2013 – Proceedings of 
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Sense-making in the sciences: models and observations
For an example of an apprenticeship-based scaffolded learning process 
within the framework of situated cognition, I shall now discuss a brief 
activity designed to develop sense-making abilities in the sciences, in 
young children. In particular, I will show you an example of leading 
a learner through the process of building a basic mental model for 
light. Models are representations of the physical world that allow the 
scientist to understand and predict future behaviour. A mental model is 
a representation of physical reality within the learner’s mind that assists 
with understanding, specifically concepts that have no obviously visible 
exemplars, such as light. (We can’t ‘see’ a light ray directly!) A physical 
predictive model is a more sophisticated formal model that can be used 
to make predictions. Models in general are typically approximations of 
the real world and can consist of diagrams, an analogy, a mathematical 
equation, and/or a simulation on the computer. Students of science 
must learn how to develop models through observations and how to 
use models to make predictions. Note that the focus is on the action 
of developing and using models within a context, which is a necessary 
condition for understanding within our framework.
The representation in Figure 1a is based on the mental model called 
‘the ray model of light’. Built into this representation is also a physical 
model of light reflection that predicts how light ‘rays’ will reflect off 
mirrors. These models for light may or may not automatically align with 
the mental model in the student’s mind. Within the framework discussed 
above, we want students to not only learn about the ray model, but also 
learn how models are developed and how to use them. Therefore, we 
will want to look at activities that guide students toward building a ray 
mental model from the ground up, where students are ultimately the 
creators of the model. Basically, students will create and then use the 
same representation shown in Figure 1a, however, they will understand 
not only what the picture represents, but how such representations are 
created in the first place. They will have learned content and practice.
the 44th ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education (Denver, CO, 2013), 
89–94.
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Fig. 1. (a) Representation for the ray model of light and reflection off a plane mirror; 
(b) a drawing of the sun consistent with drawings by primary school children; and (c) 
using a ray model of light to indicate in representative form that a light bulb is on
Cognitive apprenticeship has us model, coach, and scaffold 
instruction in expert-like practices, but we still have to answer an 
important question: how do we teach mental model building? We start 
here, because learners cannot possibly begin making sense of their 
world until they have first built a mental model for it.13 Foundationally, 
students will build a mental model for light, often subconsciously, long 
before instruction, and that model may not conform to the model of 
the expert.14 So there are two issues that we face: (1) dealing with the 
potentially erroneous model, and (2) building a new one. In Seymour 
Papert’s constructionist learning students are guided through activities 
where they must construct their own mental models of the world 
around them, using information they already know to ‘construct’ new 
knowledge.15 This means rather than teach-by-telling where the model 
is just provided, often in opposition to the well-formed model already 
in the student’s head, we want students to build models based on their 
own experiences and observations.
Even students at the beginning of primary education already have 
a fairly sophisticated ray model that they use in their minds when 
thinking about light. Imagine asking a young child to draw a picture of 
the sun. More than likely, most of the students in the class will draw a 
picture similar to that shown in Figure 1b which shows a picture of the 
13	 G.E.	Box,	‘Robustness	in	the	strategy	of	scientific	model	building’,	in	Robustness	in	Statis-
tics, ed. R. Launer and G. Wilkinson (New York, 1979).
14 R.M.J Byrne, and P.N. Johnson-Laird, ‘“If” and the problems of conditional reason-
ing’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (2009), 282–7.




sun produced by a primary-school student in the USA. Interestingly, I 
get essentially the same pictures whether I am working with a group 
of elementary school children, college physics majors, or in-service 
teachers from around the world. In constructionist pedagogy, this pre-
existing mental framing of the sun will be used as a starting point for 
building a mental model for light.
Figure 1c shows a student-drawn picture where the ray model of light 
is used to pictorially represent a light bulb turned off and on. Objects 
that create their own light have straight lines emanating in all directions 
from the source. Objects that do not create their own light, or that are 
turned off, do not have such rays. These student-generated images serve 
as an excellent jumping-off point for discussing models, which provides 
the necessary explicit instruction and reflection. Does the sun actually 
look like this? Do we see individual little rays coming off of its surface? 
No, but light itself is impossible to draw since it isn’t like regular stuff. 
Students have built a way to understand the world around them, and 
specifically an aspect of the world that has no observable exemplar. The 
learner is making sense of the physical world through a model, and the 
model is built of useful experiences they already possess.
Sense-making in the humanities: theoretical frameworks
Let us now briefly look at an example of sense-making in the 
humanities, specifically the theoretical framework in historical analysis. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, effective history learning should go 
beyond simply knowing what happened in the past.16 An understanding 
of history requires analysis of why events happened and the context 
surrounding those events. Similar to the science classroom discussed 
above, the history classroom should be an environment where learners 
develop an understanding of history by doing historical analysis in a 
manner consistent with the way the expert historian analyses history: a 
cognitive apprenticeship.17
16 M.T. Downey and L.S. Levstik, ‘Teaching and Learning History’, in Handbook of Research 
on Social Studies Teaching and Learning, ed. J.P. Shaver (New York, 1991), 400–10; H. 
Johnson, Teaching of History in Elementary and Secondary Schools, with Application to 
Allied Studies, rev. ed. (New York, 1940).
17 J. Brophy, ‘Teaching Social Studies for Understanding and Higher-order Applications’, El-
ementary School Journal, 90 (1990), 351–417.
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Similar to the model discussed above in science, theoretical 
frameworks provide a perspective through which to examine a topic 
in history. The theoretical framework serves as a model of sorts used 
by the investigator to craft an argument. It can narrow the research 
question, and can help historians create hypotheses about the higher-
order ‘why’ questions found in the study of history, for example. Within 
the practice of history, theoretical frameworks often come from other 
disciplines, such as economics and the social sciences. For example, 
students of history could examine slavery in the American south-east 
from a social, economic, political, or a cultural perspective.
Ultimately, the theoretical framework becomes the ‘lens’ through 
which the learner views and interpret the facts. It is one way to make 
sense of history. I shall not discuss specific examples of teaching 
history as I have with science, because the teaching of history falls 
outside my area of expertise. However, there is significant documented 
research in the area of history education where an approach to teaching 
for understanding founded on situated cognition and cognitive 
apprenticeship is beginning to show promise.18
Summary: the commonalities between making sense of light and 
history
There are significant parallels between how students best learn how to 
make sense of and understand light and history. This paper has discussed 
the construction of models and frameworks that serve as ‘lenses’ 
through which the learner makes sense of the world. In the case of light, 
students can build a model in their mind that serves as a representation 
of light, which can be used to make prediction about future behaviour 
and provide understanding about something not explicitly visible to the 
naked eye. In the case of historical analysis, the theoretical framework 
similarly serves as a model in the mind of the learner, which can be used 
18 L.S. Levstik, ‘Building a Sense of History in a First-grade Class’ in Advances in Research 
on Teaching, Vol. 4, Case Studies of Teaching and Learning in Social Studies, ed. J. Bro-
phy (Greenwich, 1993), 1–31; L. Darling-Hammond, ‘The Social Studies Near Century’s 
End: Reconsidering Patterns of Curriculum and Instruction’, Review of Research in Educa-
tion, 20 (1994), 223–54; S.S. Wineburg, ‘Probing the Depths of Students' Historical Knowl-
edge’, Perspectives: American Historical Association Newsletter, 30 (1992), 18–24.
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to make sense of historical events. Note that both the ray model and the 
theoretical framework are but one means each of discovering our world, 
offering a singular perspective. As students progress in science, they 
begin to learn other models for light, such as a wave model, and build 
more and more sophisticated ways of knowing. Similarly, the economic 
perspective in historical analysis provides one way to ‘see’ an event, 
with many more possible views available. Furthermore, as students 
progress in their learning, they build a more and more sophisticated 
understanding of history by recognizing patterns.
The main point of this paper is that there is commonality across 
the disciplines with respect to sense-making. Situated cognition as a 
theory of learning is not domain specific. Once you accept that knowing 
is only one aspect of understanding, then cognitive apprenticeship can 
become your preferred tool for preparing students to make sense of 
their world for themselves. The parallels between learning science and 
learning history, or art, or language are apparent when one steps back 
to see them. And recognizing these parallels is the learner’s first step 
towards developing a systematic and consistent epistemology that they 
can use in their own sense-making. Because of this, we should begin 
addressing in our classrooms the cross-cutting nature of the practices 
of all learners, so that students can see how what they are doing when 
analyzing history is not epistemologically dissimilar to their physics 
class.
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